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The capacity to ensure a secure return on an investment is one 
of the most powerful incentives to invest. Since investment in 
human, physical or other forms of capital contributes to growth, 
it follows that the degree of insecurity prevailing in an economy 
is a key determinant of development. Indeed, recent empirical 
work has found that indexes of the degree of investment insecurity 
and government measures to induce greater security are strongly 
correlated with international variations in both levels and growth 
rates of labor productivity
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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the impact of crime on private investment in eleven South 
American countries. We adapt a model proposed by Acevedo and Mora (2008) 
to include crime, understood as the insecurity due to violence and criminal and 
illegal actions. We find that crime affects private investment in two levels. First, 
an increase in the expected cost resulting from crime diminishes private invest-
ment. Second, the variance of crime decreases the amount of investment. Using 
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data from the Penn World Tables and the oas Hemispheric Security Observatory, 
we build a panel data set for the South American countries from 2000 to 2010 
and quantify our model using a unique index of crime that accounts for average 
and variation effects within each country. After accounting for time invariant 
unobservable heterogeneity and using a fixed effect panel data approach, we find 
that crime has a negative effect on increases in private investment. These results 
are consistent after several robustness checks.
Keywords: Crime, insecurity, investment, development, South America. 
jel Classifications: K4, F21, F36, O40.
RESUMEN
El precio del crimen: Cómo el crimen afecta 
la inversión privada en Sur América
Este artículo analiza el impacto del crimen sobre la inversión privada en once 
países de Sur América. Se adaptó el modelo de Acevedo y Mora (2008) para in-
cluir el crimen, entendiéndolo como la inseguridad causada por actos criminales, 
ilegales y de violencia en un país. Se encontró que el crimen afecta a la inversión 
privada en dos aspectos. Primero, el aumento del costo esperado resultante del 
crimen disminuye la inversión privada. Segundo, la varianza del crimen disminu-
ye el monto de inversión. Seguidamente, usando información del Penn World 
Tables y oas Hemispheric Security Observatory, se construyó un panel de datos 
de países suramericanos de 2000 hasta 2010 y cuantificamos nuestro modelo 
usando un índice único del crimen que tiene en cuenta los efectos promedio y 
su variación en cada país. Teniendo en cuenta una heterogeneidad no-observa-
ble invariable en el tiempo y una aproximación de efectos fijos en un modelo 
de datos de panel, encontramos que el crimen tiene un impacto negativo sobre 
los aumentos en la inversión privada. Estos resultados son robustos a diferentes 
niveles de prueba.
Palabras Clave: Crimen, inseguridad, inversión, desarrollo, Sur América.
Clasificaciones jel: K4, F21, F36, O40
49
THE PRICE OF CRIME: HOW CRIME AFFECTS PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AMERICA
I. INTRODUCTION
As with any inter-temporal decision, investment is affected by individuals’ 
expectations about the future. Crime and insecurity create an unstable environ-
ment that negatively affects these expectations. According to the United Nations 
2013 Global Study on Homicide, Latin America is the world’s most violent re-
gion, superseding Africa: of the world’s 437.000 homicides in 2012, more than 
a third (36%) were committed in North America, Latin America and the Ca-
ribbean. In the South American sub-region, five countries lead these statistics: 
Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile. However, there exists a large 
gap among them, with the last two countries showing homicide rates of less than 
10%. Alongside these high crime rates, the levels of investment have shown a 
downward trend in some of these countries. According to Manrique (2006, pp. 
1-2), in Latin America “criminal impunity intimidates civil society, and the social 
and economic costs of insecurity affect foreign investment…”.
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the relationship between 
crime and private investment in a country and a region. More specifically, we es-
timate the effect of crime on private investment using a panel dataset of 11 South 
American countries from 2000 to 2010.Part of our goal is to develop a measure of 
crime and its effect on investment. To measure crime we use the oas Hemispheric 
Security Observatory statistics on homicide, crime, suicide and violence in each 
country and build a country-specific composite index.1 The construction of this 
index is inspired in the Uniform Crime Reports (ucR) used by the Federal Bu-
reau Investigation in the United States, known also as ‘crime index’.
Crime negatively affects individuals’ investment decisions. The cost of uncer-
tainty of future returns diminishes the incentive for investing and increases the 
propensity to consume more today. Furthermore, not only would the average 
rate of crime affect investment, but also its variability, since the stability of expec-
tations affects investment and planning for the future. Empirically, we find that 
the rate of private investment decreases almost 0,26% when the crime index in-
creases 1%. Given the high levels of crime in some parts of South America, crime 
reduction would have a significant positive impact on investment. Although we 
work with different model specifications, it is remarkable that in all models the 
variable representing crime is significant and shows the expected negative sign.
1 In this paper we will use the words crime and crime index interchangeably. 
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Crime and insecurity have different layers and presentations, so they may af-
fect differently individuals’ perceptions about the future. Other ways of viewing 
crime is considering personal security versus private property security, or distin-
guishing between organized crime, on the one hand, and random and common 
crime, on the other. These different events may create different types of crime 
that, we hypothesize, would affect investment levels in diverse ways in regions 
where crime and insecurity are higher than in developed countries. However, the 
aggregation of these events would still create a feeling of an unstable environment 
that would impact individuals’ forecasts about the future of the economy.
The paper is divided as follows. Section ii reviews the literature. Section iii 
explains the conceptual framework and hypotheses in developing the theoretical 
model. Section iv presents the methodology and model specification. Section v 
offers an overview of the data. Section vi shows the different tests applied to the 
series to check for unit roots and cointegration. Section vii shows the results and 
Section viii provides the robustness check. Some concluding remarks are offered 
in Section ix.
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In recent years, many authors have studied the relationship between crime, as 
a rate and an index, and economic variables. The social framework behind the 
concept of crime could be a possible motivation for these kinds of studies. The 
literature on this topic is ample and has several different presentations. Starting 
with Becker’s (1968) seminal paper on crime and punishment, economists have 
been incorporating the analysis of crime, criminal behavior, and economic out-
comes to mainstream economic literature. 
So far, two branches of this literature have been developed. One examines 
the determinants of crime and the other studies its social consequences. This 
paper addresses the second line of research. Numerous studies have examined 
the mechanisms through which crime, directly or indirectly, affects society and 
generates costs (European Commission, 2010). For instance, using a county-lev-
el comparison in the United States, Burnham, et al. (2004) find that there is a 
negative effect of crime, specifically violent crime, on per capita income growth. 
On the other hand, Peri (2004) finds a negative impact of crime on per capita 
income growth and employment at provincial levels in Italy. In a cross-country 
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analysis, the World Bank (2006 and 2007) finds a strong negative effect of crime 
on growth, even after controlling for human capital accumulation and income 
inequality. Beginning with Cornwell and Trumbell (1994), panel data approaches 
are standard in the economic literature on the costs of crime.
Our goal here is to underline the most relevant findings to date on the effects 
of crime on private investment. First, we emphasize the importance of using pan-
el data techniques in these types of studies because they increase the robustness 
of the results and can account for variations that enhance the identification of 
these effects. Second, we want to show the mixed results found in the literature 
on this relationship. Some of these studies use crime rates, such as homicide 
rates, as indicators of crime, while others use some kind of index or combina-
tion of indexes that include a broader definition of crime.2 In what follows, we 
present what we believe is a novel approach, using a country-specific index that 
accounts for crime levels in each economy.
In our review of the literature we found no studies of South America as a 
region. There are, however, studies on Latin America as a whole (Di Tella, et al., 
2012). This is, perhaps, because the latter is a larger economic region. But given 
the closeness in terms of economic, geographic, social, cultural and political con-
nections among the countries of South America, this part of the Latin American 
subcontinent deserves a study that specifically focuses on it.
Lloyd and Marceau (2003) use an equilibrium model in a dynamic setting 
that links insecurity, credit market imperfections and economic development. 
They highlight the importance of improving security to increase investment and 
emphasize how the degree of insecurity perceived by investors is the result of 
many factors, such as corrupt officials, the crime rate, rent-seekers, the number 
of individuals who prefer to undertake illegal and, as Bhagwati (1982) alleged, 
directly unproductive profit-seeking activities. Others, such as Rosenfeld (2009), 
find a relationship between crime, measured by the homicide rate and acquisitive 
crime, and regional economic conditions. Rosenfeld studies four regions of the 
United States using a data panel model with fixed effects, and finds that there is 
2 One of the difficulties of working with crime rates in Latin America is the differences in the measurement 
of crime across countries. Even after accounting for population, the gross numbers would be counting different 
measures from different countries (Di Tella, et al., 2012). Institutional differences in recording crime, as well as 
differences in the way they are reported and the efficiency of public security agencies, make the straight crime 
rates harder to compare across these countries.
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a significant effect of collective perception of economic conditions on acquisitive 
crime. His findings underline the important dynamic relationship between crime 
and economic conditions. That is, negative local economic perceptions could 
encourage criminal behavior, while local high crime could affect individuals’ will-
ingness to invest in the area. 
Even in cases where researchers find no evidence of a relationship between 
crime rates and economic conditions, their recommendations still emphasize the 
importance of programs that enhance public safety. For instance, Krisberg, Guz-
mán and Vuong (2009) found no evidence of a relationship between economic 
downturns and crime rates. However, they recommend investing in effective-com-
munity based programs in order to improve the economy and stop the growth of 
crime rates. Their analysis also supports the idea that using only crime rates to 
account for crime would limit the actual analysis behind this relationship. Our 
study attempts to shed some light into this discussion by building up the con-
cepts of crime and societal order, and incorporating several indicators that would 
probably affect individuals’ behavior towards investment and savings.
Lozano, Cabrera and Lozano (2012), following Barro (1990), include govern-
ment spending in Mexico to derive a relationship between crime and economic 
variables. Using data for 32 Mexican states to examine the impact of crime rates 
on investment and income, they conclude that investment is inversely related to 
crime in that country.
Finally, Gómez (2012) studied the link between organized crime, foreign di-
rect investment (fDi) and economic growth using a panel dataset for 19 countries. 
With three different specifications, she showed that there is no significant rela-
tionship between organized crime and fDi when a fixed effects model is used. 
However, when the regression is estimated with random effects, organized crime 
is significant at a 90% level, and has a negative relationship with fDi and growth.
III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS
A. A Theoretical View
Our goal is to develop a theoretical link between private investment and 
crime. Private investment is defined as the savings in physical capital that allows 
people to increase their wealth and future consumption and which is undertaken 
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by people and not by government. In this paper we define crime as the level of 
instability resulting from criminal acts and violence that reflects the institutional 
and judicial condition of a country. Instability, in our model, would translate 
into higher uncertainty for investors with respect to their future returns.
Following Manrique (2006), Lloyd and Marceau (2003), Gómez (2012) and 
Acevedo and Mora (2008), investment in a country is not only the result of mac-
roeconomic variables. On the contrary, investment and, particularly, private in-
vestment are affected by individuals’ behavior and forecasting of a country’s per-
formance and the likelihood of obtaining profits. Private investment is affected 
by other variables such as personal feelings or intuitions (Keynes, 1936, p.58). It 
is different from public investment, which, in theory, seeks social benefits for its 
citizens and political profits of its decision makers. Crime, although it may also 
affect society as a whole, is generally perceived as the result of a combination of 
individual and social perspectives. Even without having been a victim of crime, 
an individual may perceive crime through his/her acquaintances’ experiences 
or the social knowledge with regard to criminal activities in the country or area.
Acevedo and Mora (2008) found a direct relationship between real gDp per 
capita and the government share of real gDp, on the one hand, and the rate of 
private investment, on the other. They estimated a regression model with panel 
data for twenty Latin American countries from 1995 to 2003. Not only is the 
rate of private investment affected by gDp per capita and the government’s share 
of gDp, but also by its lagged value. Therefore, private investment derives from an 
autoregressive process, so past values affect current values. In this paper we will 
extend the theoretical work of Acevedo and Mora (2008) to include the relation-
ship between private investment and crime.
In our model, we assume that an individual has an income of 1 monetary 
unit. In the present he has to decide how much to consume and how much to 
invest. We also assume that each monetary unit invested by the individual will 
give him a future return of 1 more monetary unit (his profit), so that he has to 
decide between the utility of present versus future consumption. Figure 1 shows 
this trade-off.
One fact about crime stands out: there is no country without crime; that is, 
there is no country or place with perfect security. If we compare countries with 
different cultures and economic and political realities we can construct a relative 
scale, in which countries with low crime rates score 0, and so on. However, crime 
could never be 0 when we compare nations with similar characteristics, such as 
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the South American countries. Or, even more interesting, when we compare a 
country across time with its own crime levels. In relative terms, in the same coun-
try individuals may sense higher levels of crime even if, overall, that particular 
country’s crime levels are low. Therefore, variations from its level of crime may be 
internally more relevant than the actual gross level comparison across countries 
when individuals decide on private investments. Now the same individual pre-
sented in the previous figure will take into account a new factor: crime (Figure 2).
FIGURE 1
The Trade-Off between Present and Future Consumption
FuturePresent
1MU (1MU + 1MU)
If 1Mu in the present > (1Mu + 1 Mu) in the future ⇒ consuMes
If 1Mu in the present < (1Mu + 1 Mu) in the future ⇒ invests
FIGURE 2





Crime ≅ 0 ⇒ Consumption(0,1) ∧ Investment (0,1)
Crime = 1 ⇒ Consumption(0,1) ∧ Investment (0,1)
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Therefore, crime replaces the individuals’ pleasure or utility of consumption. 
It is possible that the sensation of uncertainty and insecurity diminishes the rel-
evance of the return (pleasure to consume) analysis. So, crime could produce a 
negative shock on an individual’s private investment decision because it would 
represent an indirect cost that diminishes future pleasure (or expected return). 
B. Private Investment and Crime
In our model, then, crime is a determinant of private investment. It is assumed 
that individuals weigh the possibility of investing by considering the rate of re-
turn between different options (investments) or the pleasure of consuming at 
different moments (present or future). In our case, we will assume that the rate 
of return is measured by the pleasure to consume. Thus,
r* = r(1 - (λ)) (1)
Where,
r is the return without crime, and 
λ is the cost that crime represents to investors. 
It is assumed that λ is normally distributed, with an expected value λ  and a 
variance σ λ
2 , i.e., λαN(λ ,σ λ
2 ) .When crime does not affect investment, λ = 0; 
otherwise, crime produces a negative effect on investment.
r* = r (2)
In Equation (2) individuals would be motivated to invest his or her money 
if the future return affected by crime (r*) is equal to the return of consuming in 
the present (in our analysis, the rate of return represents consumption pleasure). 
Suppose that there are N investors defined by Equation 1, and each is endowed 
with one unit of capital. Equation (2) determines whether investors will consume 
today or the next period. Further we assume that to consume in the present 
investors have to bear an opportunity cost: ϕ ∈ 0, ∞⎡⎣ ) . This opportunity cost 
is the security of having some wealth or profit in the future or the possibility 
56
RAFAEL ALEXIS ACEVEDO RUEDA Y MÓNICA ISABEL GARCÍA-PÉREZ
to consume more in the future, and differs between investors according to the 
probability f(ϕ ) . Consequently, the value of switching to consume in the present, 





Where δ is a discount factor.
For simplicity, it is assumed that, after an individual makes his/her decision, 
he/she cannot switch back (Rodrik, 1991, pp. 236-237). If the individual decides 
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Because the high variance of crime reduces the risk-adverse individuals’ in-
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Which leads to
ϕ > λ r
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Where ϕ0 is the critical value of opportunity cost.
An individual with ϕ > ϕ0  will prefer to invest or postpone his/her present 
consumption. From equations (5) and (6), the total individuals who would invest 
when crime affects investment decisions is:




From equations (6) and (7) we can derive the effects of crime on investment:
dl
dλ
= − Nf(ϕ0 )
dϕ0
dλ
= − Nf(ϕ0 )
r
δ
< 0  (8)
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= − Nf(ϕ0 )v’ σ λ
2( ) < 0  (9)
Equation (8) confirms the basic intuition behind the effect of crime on pri-
vate investment. The increase in the expected cost resulting from crime reduces 
private investment. Meanwhile, Equation (9) implies that the variance of crime 
reduces the amount of investment. Therefore, not only crime affects private 
investment on average levels but also on second moments. Low crime is not 
enough for stable private investment if the variation of crime levels is too high. 
Investors have a long-run vision, so they will not only consider short-run levels of 
crime but also its variability across years until a low-crime trend is clearly defined. 
The degree of insecurity in an economy may affect that level of security and, as a 
result, the rate of economic growth. Even labor productivity would be affected by 




We use panel data for 11 countries in South America which allows us to ex-
amine the variation in crime across countries with relatively similar cultural and 
social backgrounds. Our basic framework is a model where y
it
 is a linear function 
of k explanatory variables x
k
, where k = 1, 2, 3, …, k:





i = N countries and t = 1, …, T observations over time; 
u
it
 = is a country/time specific error term that includes a group of omitted 
variables and can be written as: 
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uit =α i + φt + ε it  (11)
So, the error term has an individual component that never varies across time, 
α
i
; a temporal component that never varies across countries i, φ
t
 (country specific 
effect); and, finally, a component ε
it
 that represents the effects of all other vari-
ables that vary over time and countries.
B. Specification
We develop a model that relates individual private investment to crime. Ace-
vedo and Mora (2008) find that private investment in Latin American countries 
in any given year is determined by its value in the previous year (autoregressive 
level 1) and other variables. Gómez (2012), following Montero (2008), shows that 
one of the determinants of foreign direct investment is lagged real gDp. Although 
foreign direct investment does not necessarily translate into local private invest-
ment, their trends are most likely parallel. Therefore, we define our model as 
follows:
Sit =α + β1 g i( t −1)( ) + β2 gyit( ) + β3si( t −1) + γ CRIMEit( ) + β4popit + ε it  (12)
Where,
 α is a constant; 
g is the government share of real gDp (Laspeyres); 
gy is real gDp per capita;
s
i(t -1) is the lagged private investment rate;
pop is population, and 
ε the error term.
cRiMe is defined as an index that represents crime levels relative to country 
specific levels and varies across time and countries. The error term, ε, also varies 
by country and period of time. On the basis of the Uniform Crime Reporting 
Crime Statistics (crime index) used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 
following the indexation methodology used by Feng (2001) and Lee (2004), we 
compute the following:
59
THE PRICE OF CRIME: HOW CRIME AFFECTS PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AMERICA
CRIMEit =








The denominator is the Max Value of the Numerator (without missing values), 
so, cRiMe = (0,1), where 1 represents the highest level of insecurity.3 This indica-
tor wsould allow us to account not only for the average crime levels but also for 
country-specific deviations from this level.
We expect a positive effect related to all the explanatory variables (g, gy, s
i(t-1) ), 
while the coefficient related to the variable cRiMe should be negative, as derived 
from the model. After tests of cointegration, we use the variables in log terms.
V. DATA
The panel data was obtained from the Penn World Table 7.1 (Heston, Sum-
mers and Aten, 2012) and the Organization of American States Hemispheric Se-
curity Observatory (oas, 2015). The sample includes information for 11 countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, 
Uruguay and Venezuela). The panel includes yearly data from 2000 to 2010 (11 
years). The information covers a total of 121 observations.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. 
Countries are listed alphabetically.
The variable crime was constructed with oas crime variables. It is an index that 
represents changes within a country’s crime trend and it is different to the crime 
rates used to rank countries in terms of crime levels. As noted before, it is diffi-
cult to compare raw indicators of crime levels across countries when they report 
these indicators differently (Di Tella, et al., 2012). However, within a country the 
variation of crime would be consistent. This second notion is what our variable 
crime captures. We included suicide rates to build the variable crime. Though 
some may not consider suicide an indicator of crime, it can be understood as 
3  In comparing countries with different institutional backgrounds, statistical standardization is necessary 
(Di Tella, et al., 2012). The usefulness of a crime index is originally discussed by Sellin (1931). Some researchers 
criticized the balance weighted system used in this index, but Blumstein (1974) shows that the direction of a 
modified index with weight differentiation across offences was following similar trends and was also based on 
an arbitrary assignation of gravity levels to each crime. 
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TABLE 1
South America: Summary Statistics
COUNTRY
s g gy crime pop

































































































































































































Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Sources: Penn World Tables 7.1, oas, The World Bank, and authors’ calculations.
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an indicator of aggressiveness in a society.4 Other crime variables, such as sexual 
offenses, were not included because generally victims do not report sexual assaults, 
so numbers are often underestimated.
In constructing the variable cRiMe, the number of observations decreases be-
cause the index is a compound of all the available indicators of crime. So when 
an individual country misses one of the variables in a particular year, we are 
unable to build the indicator. Nevertheless, in the final data there is no country 
with more than six missing values for the variable cRiMe. 
As reported in Table 1, Suriname, at 71,13%, has the highest mean rate of 
investment. Guyana has the highest mean government share of RgDpl (17,32%). 
Chile has the highest mean real gDp per capita (us$10.941,54 at 2000 prices). 
Finally, the country with the highest mean crime variation is Brazil (0,94847), 
followed by Colombia, Chile, and Venezuela. This, however, is not a ranking of 
crime levels across countries because our measure of crime shows the deviation of 
average of crime within countries rather than a raw indicator of crime.
VI. TESTING THE SERIES
A. Unit Root Test
In any time series analysis, it is important to verify that the variables are station-
ary to prove that the results are not biased. Therefore, we tested for the presence of 
unit roots in the time series. For this we used three tests: the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller-Fisher (aDf-Fisher), Phillips Perron-Fisher (PP-Fisher) and the Levin, Lin 
and Chu (llc). The results are shown in Table 2. 
Although the variable of interest is crime, we analyzed individual variables 
to gauge the effect of each one on the aggregate variable (see Apendix 2 and 
Apendix 3). When an individual intercept is included in the test equation, the 
aDf-Fisher test shows that the variable crime has an individual unit root process. 
With the pp-Fisher test the variable has an individual unit root process. llc shows 
4  McKenna, et al. (1997) show evidence that suggests, in general, a positive correlation between suicide and 
homicide rates. Overall, suicide, homicide and indictable crimes are positively correlated and reflect the level 
of disorder in society.
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that just the variable crime rejects the null hypothesis of a common unit root 
process.
When individual intercepts and trends are included in the test equation, the 
aDf-Fisher’s test shows that crime is not stationary. But the pp-Fisher test shows 
that crime has an individual unit root process. 
When the test equation does not include an exogenous variable, the aDf-Fisher 
and pp-Fisher tests show that crime has an individual unit root process. The llc 
test shows a similar result because the series have a common unit root process. 
Thus, all the series are non-stationary.
The results shown by the different tests in level are not sufficiently robust to 
prove that the series are stationary. Therefore, we conducted a test in first differ-
ence to see if the series are integrated of order 1.
Crime is not I(0) but I(1) under the aDf-Fisher and llc tests. On the other 
hand, crime is I(1) in the aDf-Fisher test with individual intercepts. 
Finally, the results in the first difference show that there is no unit root pro-
cess in the variables. So, it is possible that some of the series have a linear tenden-
cy and are stationary in the first difference.
TABLE 2
Summary of Unit Root Tests Results
adf-fisher pp-fisher llc
I II III I II III I II III
s I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
g I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
gy I(1) I(0) (-) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I0) I(1)
pop I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) (-)
crime I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(1)
Notes: (1) Individual Unit Root Tests: aDf-Fisher: Augmented Dickey Fuller-Fisher test; pp-Fisher: 
Phillips Perron-Fisher test.
(2) Include in test equation: I: Individual intercept; II: Individual intercept and trend; III: None.
(3) I(0): Integrated in order 0; I(1): Integrated in order 1; (-): Nor I(0) neither I(1).
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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B. Cointegration
With series that are integrated of first order, I(1), it should be proved that the 
series are cointegrated. If we prove cointegration, we can then estimate the model 
with the series in levels. We can also use logarithms to strengthen the results. To 
test for cointegration, we used the Augmented Dickey Fuller-Fisher, Phillips Per-
ron-Fisher and the Levin, Lin and Chu. Table 3 shows a summary of the results 
of these tests. We tested different versions of a combination of series (I to IIIa). 
Column IIIa shows the relevant results for our final model.
TABLE 3
Summary of Cointegration Test Results
pedroni kao
I II III IIIa I
Panel v-Statistic NC NC NC NC -
Panel rho-Statistic NC NC NC NC -
Panel pp-Statistic C NC NC C -
Panel adf-Statistic C NC C C -
Group rho-Statistic NC NC NC NC -
Group pp-Statistic C NC C C -
Group adf-Statistic C NC C NC -
adf - - - - C
 Notes: (1) Variables: I: s, g, gyhc, hi, su, rob; II: g, hc, hi, su, ad, rob; III: s, g, hc, hi, su, ad, rob; IIIa: s, 
g, crime, pop.
(2) Include in test equation: I: Individual intercept; II: Individual intercept and trend; III: None.
(3) C: Cointegrated; nc:Not-Cointegrated.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
The Pedroni test shows that the series g, hc, hi, s, pop and rob are not cointegrat-
ed only when a deterministic trend specification — with individual intercept and 
individual trend — is considered (see Appendix 4). Meanwhile, Kao tests rejected 
the null hypothesis of No-Cointegration. Overall, the results are consistent with 
regard to rejecting the null hypothesis of No-Cointegration when a deterministic 
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trend is not considered. For this reason, we look at the model in levels with no 
deterministic trend, and also analyze the series in logarithmic form.
VII. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
To determine the relationship between private investment and crime in South 
America we developed an econometric exercise using panel data. In the analysis, 
we use a panel data fixed effects approach.5 Individual decisions are dynamic and 
are affected by the expectations for the future.
The fixed effects model assumes that the error term u
it
 (Equation 10) is not 
random. As shown by Equation 11, it has: 1) a fixed individual component (α
i
) 
that does not change through the period but changes through individuals; 2) a 
fixed temporal component (φ
t
)that does not change through individuals (or cross 
section) but changes through the period; 3) a random component (ε
it
), that is the 
residual with characteristics of white noise that are assumed in the least square 
estimations. We calculated different versions of the model, as shown in Table 4. 
In Table 4, three different specifications are shown, combined with two dif-
ferent fixed effect styles (period and cross-section).6 In model type 1, log (cRiMe) is 
not significant when we look at period fixed effects. However, looking at period 
fixed effects in this model wouldn’t make sense. The panel data design calls for 
cross-section fixed effect that accounts for country specific time invariant charac-
teristics. Model specification 2 shows similar results to specification 1, with the 
exception that the exclusion of the log of the lag of gDp results in the significance 
of the log of cRiMe. Similar to model 1, in model 2 the cross-section specification 
shows a significant effect of crime index on individual investment. Model 3 rep-
resents a non-dynamic panel. In this version of the model, the specification with 
cross-section fixed effects shows consistent results with the first two models. The 
estimated coefficient for our variable of interest log of cRiMe is negative and is 
significant at a 5% significance level, with a high R squared and an F-statistic 
5 To check for robustness we also consider a model with random effects. However, both the F-test and Haus-
mann test rejected the hypothesis of a random effects model. Furthermore, the theoretical model specification 
supports a fixed effect model better than a random effects model. Nevertheless, the results were consistent.
6 We performed a Hausmann test for each model and rejected the fitness of random effect model.
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that shows that all variables are jointly significant at a 5% significance level. The 
likelihood test shows that the fixed effects model is adequate.
Still, it is remarkable that in almost all models the logarithm of the variable 
crime is significant, consistent, and shows the expected sign (negative). The 
cross-sectional analysis makes more sense here, given that the comparative struc-
tures and trends according to our theoretical model are within an economy. The 
estimated coefficient gives us the elasticity of investment with respect to the in-
dependent variables, after accounting for country-specific fixed effects. However 
the results could improve with a larger dataset.
Overall, these results confirm the hypothesis that the uncertainty generated 
by crime in South American countries has decreased private investment by at 
least by 0,287%-0,322%, for each 1% increase in country-specific crime levels.
TABLE 4
Summary of Econometric Results
1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
c -65,5396 -10,7978** -213,6511 -13,4743** -61,1423 -71,6533*
log(g(-1)) 17,0436*** -0,5404 - - 16,9766*** 8,5305*
log(gy) 35,53191*** 2,0559*** 28,5661*** 2,3351*** 37,2138*** 20,435***
log(crime) -2,872149*** -0,6382 -2,97613*** -0,7598* -3,22134*** -6,6573
log(pop) -15,67565* -0,2766 -0,84337 -0,3138* -16,7372* -6,1195***
s(-1) 0,07584 0,9424*** 0,013668 0,93547*** - -
       
R2 0,956583 0,985353 0,948919 0,985702 0,956367 0,705398
F-Statistic 79,31662*** 289,7875*** 72,9801*** 327,456*** 86,10804*** 11,3741***
Likelihood 14,8237*** 3,1708*** 10,7451*** 3,16918*** 89,17422*** 1,0373
Jarke-Bera 0,10373 5,1347* 0,3513 3,2789 0,04424 0,2781
Notes: (1) Method: Panel Least Square (ols). Fixed Effects.
(2) a: Cross section. b: Period.
(3) *, **, ***: significant levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(4) For accessing to the dataset as well as the results using individual variables please contact the 
authors.
(5) Results obtained with E-Views 7.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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Finally, Figure 3 shows the actual, fitted and residual of the two best models 
in this data panel exercise. In particular model 3a (fixed effects) shows the best 
adjustment to real observations.
VIII. ALTERNATIVE TESTS
In a panel exercise such as this, the robustness of the results must be tested. 
Although our model does not assume any sequence in the process, we used tsls 
to check for the possibility of simultaneity.7 Nevertheless, there exist strong lim-
itations to this exercise. On the one hand, the reduction of degrees of freedom 
for our estimates to be consistent and efficient, and, on the other hand, small 
sample issues. Furthermore, we need to formally establish the exogeneity of the 
instruments used in the model. On the other hand, in this alternative model the 
assumption of period fixed-effects would not have sense. When we assume period 
fixed-effect in practice we are pooling all the countries together each year and the 
7 For results using tsls, see Appendix 4.
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differences across them is not considered in the estimation of the effect of crime 
on investment. Also, when we are pooling all countries, the data behaves as a 
simple time series. In this representation, the autoregressive process of the series 
investment drives all the results. In the alternative models, we cannot mimic the 
versions of model 3 from Table 4 because of its non-dynamic nature. Further-
more, the results are sensitive to the assumptions of instrumental variables; in all 
cases instruments are weak instruments.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Crime and violence have been affecting South American countries’ attractive-
ness to private investment (internal and external). Regardless of each country’s 
political tendency, the problem with respect to security and violence is real, a 
daily reality for individuals living in those countries. The level of crime is high, 
so that if it has not yet touched a person, the likelihood is that it will touch him/
her someday.
Our study shows the important role that crime plays in the determination of 
future private investment in South American countries. The results show that 
crime has a negative effect in the rate of the private investment, by at least by 
0,287%-0,322%, for each 1% increase in country-specific crime levels. Neverthe-
less, we should keep in mind that this effect may be larger because crime also has 
medium term effects on the present value of the private investment rate. Given 
the dynamic version already embedded in private investment, these effects would 
be transferred across years.
Our results also support ideas already discussed in the previous literature. 
Governments in South America have to implement better policies of personal 
security, together with establishing strong judicial systems and crime prevention 
institutions. In this line, working only on improving economic indicators and 
launching economic policies won’t be enough if governments do not combine 
those with crime reduction strategies. If they wish to improve their attractiveness 
to private investors (internal and external) policy analysis should include the issues 
of personal security and violence that these nations face. We strongly believe, 
therefore, that the effectiveness of policies to boost private investment would 
likely be enhanced when measures that improve security are also adopted.
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Description of Variables and Sources
Variable 
name Description Source
s Investment Share of Real Gross Domestic Product (Laspeyres). % in 2000 Constant Prices Penn World Table 7.1
g Government Share of Real Gross Domestic Product (Laspeyres). % in 2000 Constant Prices Penn World Table 7.1
gy Real Gross Domestic Product per capita. Unit $ in 2000 constant prices Penn World Table 7.1
hc
Homicide (Criminal System): “Number of victims of offences of 
intentional homicide recorded by the police. Intentional homi-
cide means death deliberately inflicted on a person by another 
person, including infanticide”
oas, Observatory on 
Citizen Security - 
Data Repository.
hi
Homicide (health system): “Number of victims of homicide and 
mortal injuries inflicted by another person with intent to injure 
or kill, such as deaths resulting from all kinds of assault, sexual 
violence, neglect and abandonment, maltreatment, non acciden-
tal manslaughter, legal intervention, assassination, and murder”.
oas, Observatory on 
Citizen Security - 
Data Repository.
su Suicide: “Deaths caused by self-inflicted and intentional injuries, for people aged 5 years and older”.
oas, Observatory on 
Citizen Security - 
Data Repository.
ad
Accidental death by Illicit Drug Overdose: Number of deaths 
caused by an illicit drug overdose. “An illicit drug overdose is the 
accidental or intentional use of an illicit drug in an amount that 
is higher than is normally used. Illicit drug, commonly called 
controlled substances, is a substance that alters the mind in a 
psychoactive way and is illegal in the eyes of the law and punisha-
ble with criminal justice”.
oas, Observatory on 
Citizen Security - 
Data Repository.
rob
Robbery: Total number of offences of robbery recorded by police. 
Robbery means the theft of property from a person, overcoming 
resistance by force or threat of force. The category “Robbery” 
should include muggings (bag-snatching) and the theft with vio-
lence, but should exclude pick pocketing and extortion.
oas, Observatory on 
Citizen Security - 
Data Repository.




Crime: Proxy variable that represents the feeling or sensation of 
insecurity for illegal and criminal acts in a country. This factor 
was built with crime variables obtained in the oas hemispheric 
security observatory. It is obtained through the equation:
CRIMEit =
hcit + hiit + suit + adit + robit
MaxVali
The denominator is the Max Value of the Numerator (without 
missing values), so, cRiMe = (0,1] where 1 represents the more 
insecurity.
oas, Observatory on 
Citizen Security - 
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APPENDIX 4
Summary of Econometric Results
1c 1d 2c 2d
c -1473,54** 2,2838 -314,1241* -6,642
log(g(-1)) -40,7105** -1,3216* - -
log(gy) -10,588 0,5996 11,7577 1,5472
log(crime) 2,5784 4,9946*** 0,5445 3,6386*
log(pop) 102,079** -0,1739 13,7989 -0,2686
s(-1) 0,051 0,9588*** 0,4437** 0,9384***
     
R2 0,944844 0,9785 0,95811 0,9806
F-Statistic 74,301*** 255,1663*** 56,611*** 276,519***
Likelihood - - - -
Jarke-Bera 0,8365 0,5989 2,8402 0,5638
Notes: (1) Method: Panel Two Stages Least Square (tsls). Fixed Effects.
(2) c: Cross section. d: Period.
(3) *, **, ***: significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
(4) For accessing to the dataset as well as the results using individual variables please contact the 
authors.
(5) Results obtained with E-Views 7
Source: Authors’ calculation.
